Abstract: We introduce a Bayesian method to infer repeated-game strategies in the form of ifthen statements that best describe individuals' observed actions. We apply this method to buyer behavior in posted-offer market experiments. While the strategies of one-quarter of the buyers in our experiments correspond to the game-theoretic prediction of passive price-taking, for three-quarters of the buyers we infer repeated-game strategies that condition on time, price, and combinations of time and price. Our analysis fills a gap in a literature that studies the convergence of pricing behavior in posted-offer markets but has not addressed the market as a repeated game. We propose that strategy inference should at least complement existing methods of statistical inference on observed strategic behavior.
Introduction
The flourishing of game theory in the late 1970s and 1980s provided experimental economists with a wealth of opportunities to test its predictions under controlled laboratory conditions. Indeed, many economics experiments consist of duplicating the assumptions of game-theoretic models and then establishing that subjects' play does not converge to equilibrium predictions, despite repeated play and monetary incentives (see, e.g., ; Davis and Holt, 1993; Kagel and Roth, 1995) . Through nonparametric statistical tests and regression analysis, researchers conclude that observed behavior differs significantly from the equilibrium outcomes of the model.
When departures from equilibrium play are observed, two approaches are typical. Sometimes, subjects' responses from questionnaires are analyzed in an attempt to glean information about their motivations and intentions. More often, follow-up experiments (e.g., variations in the original game in which one variable at a time is altered) are conducted to separate out competing explanations for the observed deviations from equilibrium. Data from numerous follow-up experiments accumulates and new theories are advanced to explain behavior and unify the body of evidence.
In this paper, we take a very different, though complementary tack. To understand deviations from predicted outcomes in our market experiments, we make use of subjects' observed actions to infer repeated-game strategies that best describe their play. Our goal is threefold: first, to develop an easily implementable technique to infer repeated-game strategies from observed actions; second, to illustrate the usefulness of the technique for categorizing subject behavior in a way that is intuitive and interpretable as a strategy thereby providing new insights into the behavior of subjects in this environment; third, to evaluate the success of different strategies.
The game we examine is a posted-offer market in which a monopolist faces a small number of buyers, either two or four; monopolists are either informed or uninformed as to the number of buyers in the market. 1 According to the rules of the posted-offer market, the monopolist posts a price and a quantity of a good to make available at that posted price. Observing the posted price (but not the quantity), the randomly ordered buyers then proceed one at a time to make privately the number of purchases that each desires. The take-it-or-leave-it nature of this market institution limits buyer strategic behavior to the rejection of profitable purchases, that is, the rejection of purchases at a price below the buyer's valuation, referred to as demand withholding. In a finitely repeated game, the unique subgame-perfect-equilibrium strategy requires a rational buyer to make all profitable purchases in every period; demand withholding therefore should not be observed.
However, withholding behavior has been observed, even intensely, in a number of studies (see Ruffle, 2000 , and the references therein); buyers withhold demand in the hope of bringing prices down in subsequent periods.
We attempt to understand withholding behavior in this environment by inferring unobserved, repeated-game withholding strategies from the observed withholding actions of buyers in 30-round experiments. These buyer withholding strategies take the form of (possibly nested) if-then statements. An example of a simple strategy would be to withhold two units of demand if the posted price exceeds a threshold level, but to make all profitable purchases otherwise. To identify strategies that best describe the observed behavior of each individual buyer, we combine a Bayesian procedure with a technique from the binary classification tree literature (Devroye, Gyorfi and Lugosi, 1996) . For the first time we are able to formulate repeated-game strategies that people may actually be using in this environment. We report distributional information such as the probability that a buyer's strategy is of different complexities, the probability that the strategy contains certain conditioning variables, the most likely strategy that generated the data and how well it fits the observed decisions. Our experiments thus combine traditional laboratory methods with a new method of data analysis.
One advantage of our approach is that we do not discard the game-theoretic prediction of passive price taking in every round, but rather characterize the precise nature of the deviation from equilibrium play on a subject-by-subject basis. For some buyers (about one-quarter of them), we find that the equilibrium prediction of no withholding is accurate. For the remaining three-quarters of the buyers, we fit on an individual basis repeated-game strategies that most accurately describe the variables upon which the buyer conditions her withholding decisions. Characterizing play with strategies offers insights unavailable in traditional econometric techniques: it places inference into the language of game theory, thus bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior. 2 We find evidence that subjects use, either implicitly or explicitly, strategies that condition on time, price, and combinations of the two variables. Furthermore, the more complex the strategy (where complexity is measured by the number of binary tests that comprise the withholding strategy), the lower are market prices and monopolist profits. Among simpler strategies, we find that unconditional and intense withholding early in the game is more effective against the monopolist than strategies that trigger withholding above price thresholds or that intensify withholding over time. Since buyer profits are not significantly correlated with these strategy characteristics, and since the observed prices in these sessions were significantly below the monopoly price, the early withholding strategy appears to be an effective counteracting response to monopoly power.
Our procedure is closely related to the early work on identifying subject heterogeneity in experiments by El-Gamal and Grether (1995), who used a Bayesian procedure to estimate decision rules in a population of subjects faced with a static, individual choice task. Their goal was to discover whether people are Bayesian, and they did this convincingly by assuming a functional form for the decision rule and using their Bayesian technique to draw inference regarding the number and types of rules that generated their data. By contrast, our application is to repeated-game strategies, which requires both a very different strategy model and computational technique for inference. 3 Houser, Keane, and McCabe (2004) provide a method to draw inference regarding the number and types of decision rules in a population of subjects playing a dynamic game. They estimate a polynomial approximation of the value function (that is, the expected value of future payoffs) in state variables similar to Keane (1999, 2001) , allowing individual decision rules to differ by the parameters in their value functions. They illustrate their technique with a game that subjects play against nature based on a model of school choice, and find evidence for interesting 2 Data analysis typically focuses on statistical differences between experimental treatments, or regressions which allow for individual differences as fixed or random effects. Our analysis provides for different non-linear functional forms for individual subjects. 3 Other probabilistic choice models include Stahl and Wilson (1995) who study heterogeneity in levels of reasoning in games solvable through iterated dominance specifying both the form and number of decision rules, and McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) who introduce Quantal Response Equilibrium, which makes it possible to study subject behavior in deviation from optimality (though not subject heterogeneity).
behavioral types. This approach is very flexible because the researcher does not have to specify a priori the functional form of the decision rules, rather, one simulates the rules to interpret the behavior. Our application gains some efficiency (at the cost of flexibility) by specifying a strategy model. Our strategy model, however, is useful for a rather wide class of multi-player games, and it covers both strategies predicted by theory and simpler rules of thumb. And for games in which if-then statements can be useful characterizations of decision-making, it is rather simple to implement. 4 The direct inference methodology in this paper is complementary to several existing approaches.
In the strategy method of Selten et al. (1997) , strategy choices are made observable through elicitation; a second approach is to identify strategies by tracking the manner in which subjects collect We view the posted-offer market as a laboratory environment well-suited for the display of our method's comparative advantages (and disadvantages). More familiar techniques like the strategy method and the analysis of protocol responses are insightful in simple games. However, the posted-offer institution is sufficiently complex and subjects' behavior is often dynamic responding to feedback during the play of the game that these familiar methods are inadequate.
We begin with a description of the experimental design and a summary of the main qualitative results in sections 2 and 3. Sections 4 and 5 detail the strategy model followed by the inference method. We present the results of strategy inference, beginning with estimates of the distributions of the inferred strategies and ending with examples of specific best-fitting strategies in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Experimental Design and Procedure

Experimental Design
Upon arriving at the laboratory, each subject sat in front of a computer terminal. The experimental software randomly assigned each subject to the role of buyer or seller and randomly grouped them to form markets. Each market consisted of a single seller (i.e., a monopolist) and either two or four buyers. We ask whether differences in buyer concentration can lead to differences in pricing policies in markets, and our simple measure of buyer concentration is the number of buyers that exist in the market.
The monopolists were given units of production to sell in the market, each with an associated cost. The buyers were given units of demand to purchase, each with an associated valuation. To induce subjects to trade, they were told that the sellers would earn, in cash, the difference between the selling price and the cost of each unit sold, and the buyers would earn the difference between the valuation and selling price on each unit purchased (see Smith, 1976 , for the induced value methodology). The cost of unsold units was not deducted from the monopolists' profits.
Figures 1a and 1b display the monopolist's induced marginal cost curve and the buyers' induced aggregate demand curve for the two-buyer and four-buyer treatments, respectively. The midpoint of the competitive price range has been normalized to 0 and, for convenience, will be referred to as the competitive price. All costs, valuations and prices will be expressed as deviations from this price.
(In the actual experiments, a constant was added to all costs and valuations so that the subjects traded in positive currency units.) The supply and demand curves were induced by providing the buyers with four units of demand, which were valued at +0. 35 In the four-buyer treatment, the demand curves were identical, while the monopolist's marginal cost curve was altered to maintain the same monopoly price and competitive price equilibrium. 5 
[insert Figures 1a and 1b here]
The subjects played 30 rounds of a two-stage game. In the first stage, the monopolist chose a price and a quantity of units to sell at that chosen price. 6 The buyers then formed a shopping queue, with the position of each buyer in the queue randomly determined in each round. The first buyer in the queue decided how many units to purchase at the posted price, then the second buyer in the queue proceeded to make all of the purchases that she desired, and so on. Thus, the seller's decision consisted of posting a price and choosing a quantity of units to sell at that price, and the buyers' decisions consisted of choosing the number of units to purchase at the posted price.
At the end of the second stage, the monopolists learned the total number of units purchased by the buyers and the profit earned from these sales. Each buyer knew only the number of units that she purchased. In each round, the subjects remained grouped in the same cohort, played the same role in the game, and were given exactly the same individual marginal cost and demand curves.
Note well the private nature of buyers' purchasing and withholding decisions. Only the individual buyer knows how many units she purchased and how many profitable units she passed up. This institutional detail makes it impossible for buyers to coordinate, even implicitly, their responses to the monopolist. More importantly for the purposes of our paper, the independent nature of buyers' actions allows us to infer individual buyer strategies.
The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game involves the monopolist posting the monopoly price (+0.20) in each round and the buyers accepting all profitable purchases at this price. According to our design, each buyer (again independent of treatment) is able to make three profitable purchases at the monopoly price. The buyer earns a total of +0.15 (+0.15 on the first purchase and 0 on the second and third purchases). The monopolist, on the other hand, sells six units in the two-buyer treatment and earns +5.50, compared to 12 sales in the four-buyer treatment and +6.40 in earnings.
When the game is repeated it is no longer a dominant strategy to accept passively all profitable purchases because with future periods left in the game a buyer can punish the monopolist by withholding profitable units of demand. This type of strategy is more costly to implement as fewer periods remain in the game because the potential gain from lower prices diminishes. Thus, while there is no cooperation in equilibrium in the complete-information game, the incomplete information framework in Kreps et al. (1982) for finitely repeated games may be relevant. Our contribution is to search for empirical evidence for this type of strategic behavior.
To illustrate the sequence of decision-making in the experiments, consider a numerical example involving a deviation from the stage-game Nash equilibrium in a two-buyer session (an analogous example can be constructed for a four-buyer session). Suppose that the monopolist posts a price of −0.10. At this price, the rational monopolist makes available for sale only seven of her eight units (since her eighth unit, at a cost of −0.05, is not profitable at this price). At this low price, there may be excess demand, since each buyer can profitably purchase four units (all units are worth at least +0.05 to them). Suppose the first buyer in the queue fulfills her entire demand for four units. Now suppose the last buyer attempts to do the same. Upon attempting to purchase the fourth unit she will be greeted with the message "Out of Stock". The monopolist thus sells seven units at a price of −0.10, the first buyer buys four units at that price, and the second buyer buys three units at that price. 7 The curves of the relevant treatment as well as the individual buyers' demand curves were made common knowledge by providing each subject with a table of costs and values of all subjects and by reading aloud the contents of the table. The market structure in these two treatments was also common knowledge so that the monopolist (and the buyers) knew precisely how many (other) buyers were in the market. 8 All experimental sessions were computerized and conducted at Ben-Gurion University. At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid a 15 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) showup payment in addition to their experimental earnings. 9 Average seller earnings (including the showup payment) were 121 NIS compared to 67 NIS for the buyers. Sessions lasted on average one hour and thirty minutes. Seven two-buyer (informed) sessions were conducted along with eight four-buyer (informed) sessions. All subjects were economics or business majors and had taken at least an introductory course in microeconomics. Participation was restricted to one session only per subject.
Experimental Control
We have designed these two treatments to hold constant, to the extent possible, all variables believed to be important to demand withholding and seller pricing. Our goal is to isolate the effect of buyer concentration on pricing policy. For instance, the intersection of the demand and cost curves (the competitive price range) occurs between −0.05 and +0.05 in both treatments; both treatments share the identical monopoly price of 20 units of currency above the competitive price (+0.20).
The fact that buyers in both treatments face a monopolist is a conscious choice to eliminate possible concerns and uncertainty that sellers may have regarding the simultaneous price choices of other sellers. In this way, we are able to concentrate on the impact of the buyers' decisions on pricing without the complication of competition between multiple sellers. More importantly, individual buyer demand curves are identical for all buyers regardless of treatment.
Finally, we held constant across treatments the surplus division between buyers and the monopolist at 6:1 in favor of the monopolist: at the competitive price, each buyer earns +0.80 compared with +4.80 for the monopolist. Ruffle (2000) shows that the surplus inequality at the competitive price is an important determinant of the degree of buyer withholding and of duopolists' prices.
Since individual buyers possess the same demand curve in these treatments, to hold constant the surplus division across treatments requires changing the monopolist's marginal cost curve (compare Figures 1a and 1b) . In Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2004), we present evidence that this change has no impact on buyer withholding or monopolist pricing. To maintain the identical competitive price range in the two treatments, we fixed the production cost for the monopolist's last unit (i.e., unit 9 At the time these experiments were conducted 4 NIS was equivalent to approximately $1 U.S. 
Experimental Results
Brief Summary of the Experimental Results
We conducted first the pair of two-buyer and four-buyer treatments in which the monopolist in each session was informed of the precise number of buyers she faced. Prices in both of these informed treatments were typically well below the monopoly price. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, prices in the two-buyer, informed treatment are significantly lower than prices in the four-buyer informed treatment. What is more, buyers in the two-buyer, informed sessions achieved these lower prices without withholding more than those in the four-buyer, informed sessions: the average per buyer, per period number of units withheld is identical in the two treatments. 10 [insert Figure 2 here] Given the controls built into the experimental design, there remain two possible explanations why prices in the two-buyer, informed treatment are lower, despite identical levels of withholding in the two treatments. First, the monopolist may simply price more cautiously when confronted with two buyers than when faced with four. Since the monopolist earns zero on sales lost to demand withholding, she may choose to post lower prices in the two-buyer sessions for fear of provoking their withholding. To explore this hypothesis, we conducted a second pair of "uninformed" treatments with identical marginal cost and demand parameters to those employed in the "informed" treatments. The sole difference between the "uninformed" and the previous pair of "informed" treatments was that in the former, the monopolist was not told how many buyer she faced; instead, she was told in both the two-buyer and four-buyer uninformed treatments that she faced "a small number of buyers, but more than one". We conducted eight two-buyer, uninformed sessions and seven four-buyer, uninformed sessions.
The most striking result in the uninformed treatments is that the price gap in the initial and middle rounds between the two-buyer and four-buyer informed treatments disappeared, as seen in Figure 3 . This suggests that the observed difference in initial pricing in the informed treatments is, at least in part, due to the monopolist pricing more cautiously when confronted with only two buyers.
[insert Figure 3 here] A second possible explanation for lower prices in the two-buyer, informed treatment is a difference in the quality of withholding between the treatments. For instance, perhaps the buyers in the two-buyer sessions condition their decisions to withhold on different variables than those in the four-buyer sessions, and these strategies are more effective in bringing prices down. The strategy inference technique employed in this paper will allow us to address this hypothesis. In the next two sections we present a method that allows us to infer a repeated-game withholding strategy for each buyer in these experiments that best describes the buyer's observed withholding decisions. We will then use these inferred strategies to gain a more complete understanding of the dynamics that led to the observed price levels in the different treatments.
The Strategy Model
The experimental design itself limits the strategic behavior of the buyers: if they wish to influence the market price they can do so only through their purchasing decisions. We thus expect a strategy, if any exists, to specify the number of units to buy in the market. Equivalently, such a strategy would specify the number of profitable units available that the buyer refuses to buy, i.e., the number of units of demand to withhold.
We model buyer strategies as binary classification trees (see Breiman, Friedman, Olshen and Stone, 1984, for a variety of applications), and introduce the strategy model by way of example with an actual inferred buyer strategy, shown in Figure 4 . This strategy contains three relational nodes, which are represented by filled circles. Relational nodes always involve a variable, a relation, and a coefficient. Each relational node is a test; the relational node at the top of the tree (called the root node) tests whether the price at time t, P (t), is less than or equal to 0.01. The strategy also contains four action nodes at the bottom of the tree, each marked by an empty circle. The left column of values below each action node lists each possible buyer decision; "0" represents the decision to withhold zero units of demand, "1" to withhold one unit, and "+" to withhold more than one unit. 11 The corresponding right column indicates the number of rounds (out of a total of 30) in which the buyer made each of the corresponding decisions: at the right-most action node this buyer withheld no units zero times, one unit zero times, and more than one unit five times.
[insert Figure 4 here] The tree in Figure 4 thus defines both the functional form of an actual strategy and classifies the observed actions of the buyer. Evaluation of the expression begins with the root node. If the expression P (t) ≤ 0.01 is true, then evaluation proceeds down to the root node's left-hand descendant node, which is the tree's left-most action node. If the expression P (t) ≤ 0.01 is false, then evaluation proceeds down to the root node's right descendant node, which is a nested relational node that specifies the test P (t) ≤ 0.04. Taken together these two relational tests represent the compound expression IF P (t) > 0.01 AND P (t) ≤ 0.04. If this compound expression is true, then evaluation proceeds to the tree's left-center action node, and if P (t) > 0.01 AND P (t) > 0.04 a third relational node labelled t ≤ 10 is reached. Evaluation proceeds at this point as before.
The grammar implicit in constructing the strategies is quite general: since the boolean operators AND and NOT (> is the same as NOT ≤) are both included in this grammar, without loss of generality, any boolean expression may be the result of combinations of relational and action nodes. It is the case that every decision in the data will always fall to exactly one action node, hence the strategy is a plan of action for all observed contingencies in the repeated game. 12 The binary tree representation of the strategy lends itself well to behavioral interpretation. The buyer whose actions are represented in Figure 4 never withheld demand whenever the posted price was low enough (below 0.01), increased withholding intensity to one unit of demand for intermediate prices (prices within the range 0.01 to 0.04), and after round 10 withheld demand intensely for high prices (above 0.04).
The class of strategies we consider consists of no more than four relational nodes. We restrict the number of relational nodes to four because estimation suffers from the "curse of dimensionality":
with each additional relational node the amount of data at the terminal nodes reduces exponentially.
With at most 30 observations for each individual, fitting more complex strategies is of questionable value. Since 89/90 buyer strategies inferred consist of strictly less than four relational nodes, this restriction is rarely binding. 13 We selected the round number, t; the round t price, P (t); the difference in price from one round to the next, ∆P (t); and the withholding decision in the previous round, W (t − 1). We allowed any coefficient actually realized during the experimental session. Since ∆P (t) never occurred in any inferred strategy, and in the few instances that W (t−1) did appear, it did not contribute to a useful interpretation of what the subjects may have been doing, we focus on t and P (t) in the subsequent analysis. The current round price is perhaps the most obvious variable upon which to base one's withholding decisions. We included the round number to allow the strategies to vary with time. 14 The appearance of time in an inferred strategy may suggest that the subject adopted one strategy at a certain point in the game and later discarded it for another strategy. That subjects may intentionally vary their demand withholding over time may be seen in the numerous buyers who, independent of prevailing prices, withheld early to signal toughness, and then later in the session, as the expected future gains from withholding dwindled, ceased to withhold.
Note that we do not include multi-period punishment strategies of the variety that withhold demand for a fixed length of time independent of what happens during the punishment phase. In our data we do not see evidence for this type of behavior, mainly because the posted-offer institution renders such forms of punishment ineffective: the monopolist is unaware that it is the same buyer who withheld, say, two units in each of the last four periods. In principle, however, it is possible to include multi-period punishments by adding a length of implementation variable at the bottom of the tree (this length is implicitly set to one round in our model).
Due to the vast number of logically-possible repeated-game strategies, the solution to the inference problem always requires a reduction of the dimensionality of the problem. We performed this reduction in at least three ways: we limited the types of demand withholding strategies through the experimental design itself (buyers do not see the choices of other buyers and the number of conditioning variables available to the buyers are few); we modelled the strategy choices as withholding 0, 1 or more than 1 unit of demand (recall the theoretical reason from footnote 11 for doing so); and we limited the maximum number of relational nodes to four. 15 Thus, the question is not whether approaches to dimensionality reduction should be taken, but whether they come at the expense of failing to gain insight into economic decisions in markets.
We cautiously suggest that our results yield such insight. Our experimental design, though simple, provides a test of the effect of buyer concentration. Our reduction of the action space is both practical and has a theoretical basis. And we will see that our limitation on the complexity of the strategies will almost never be binding when we take our model to the data. 15 Other successful studies have followed dimension reduction strategies as well. El-Gamal and Grether (1995) approach the problem through the a priori specification of functional forms of decision rules. Houser, Keane and McCabe (2004) do so through experimental design. Their subjects gain experience playing a game against a known stationary stochastic process, thus the subjects' strategies are assumed to be stationary, and the stochastic process provides power for strategy inference. In neither of these cases did simplification inhibit what was learned about decision making in economic markets.
The Bayesian Inference Method
The inference task is to find an unobserved strategy that best describes the observed actions of a subject. A difficulty is that adding complexity to a strategy will always weakly improve its ability to describe the data, but we lack a theory to guide us in selecting the appropriate level of complexity for a strategy; thus we need a method that tells us when additional complexity does not improve the fit of the strategy enough to be worthwhile. We approach this problem with a Bayesian estimation of repeated-game strategies analogous to the procedure in El-Gamal and Grether (1995), and adopt their notation. 16 We assign priors to each of the assignment problems inherent in constructing a strategy, and update by observing a sequence of decisions by an individual in a repeated game.
Defining the Assignment Problem
Let us illustrate the assignment problem by constructing a single strategy. To begin, we select the universe of n conditioning variables (an operation we call assignment zero). To construct a complete strategy requires three further assignments: (1) the number k of relational nodes, (2) the conditioning variable at each relational node, and (3) the configuration of the relational nodes in the tree representation of the strategy. The idea is that a priori we do not know the functional form of a subject's strategy, so we form priors over each of the assignments involved in constructing the functional form and update them with the likelihood.
The first assignment can in theory be any nonnegative integer, k. In Figure 5 we choose k = 2 for illustrative purposes.
[insert Figure 5 here] The second assignment involves choosing k variables for use in the k distinct relational nodes.
Anticipating the fact that no two relational nodes that contain the same variable will have the same 16 In their application to an individual choice problem, a subset of k decision rules is selected from a set of n candidate decision rules, denoted C, to best-fit the actions of a population of subjects in an experiment. There are three assignments to be made in this problem: (1) the number of decision rules k that should be used to best-fit the data, (2) the specific decision rules to take from the candidate set C to best-fit the data, and (3) the best assignment of these k specific decision rules to each individual subject. El-Gamal and Grether (1995) approach the problem by forming priors over each of these assignments, and then finding the posterior mode estimate of their joint assignment. Our approach extends their technique by inferring repeated-game strategies on a subject-by-subject basis. We also report the estimate of the posterior distribution for each individual's strategy. coefficient, we construct a candidate set C of k · n elements that contains k replications of each of the n explanatory variables. We draw without replacement from this set of variables to select the relational nodes. The example in Figure 5 , in which k = 2 and n = 2, has C = {P 1 (t), P 2 (t), t 1 , t 2 }.
Ignoring order until the third assignment, it is easy to see that there are six possible ways to choose two elements from this set of relational nodes, as shown in Figure 5 .
The third assignment is to take the k variables from the second assignment and configure them into a strategy. The lower part of Figure 5 shows the four ways that this can be done. Notice that both the configuration of the tree and the location of the variables within the configuration vary.
Forming Priors Over the Three Assignments
We first define the prior for k, the number of relational nodes in the strategy. In theory k can be any nonnegative integer (where k = 0 represents no binary tree), however we impose the restriction k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and specify a Poisson distribution for the prior P (k) truncated at k = 4. The
Poisson distribution allows us to weight strategies with fewer relational nodes more heavily while varying only one free parameter, which is intuitively appealing if one believes that more complex strategies are less likely (see Denison, Mallick, and Smith, 1998 for priors in binary regression trees and Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2001 for heterogeneity in bounded reasoning):
where λ is the mean of the distribution. Thus the specification of this prior amounts to the specification of the mean λ of the number of relational nodes. We will report the sensitivity of the inference results to a range of λ.
We assign an uninformative (i.e., uniform) prior over the selection of k decision nodes from the set C of k · n nodes for use as strategy components. For this we need to calculate the number of such possible choices that exist. The calculation is straightforward: the number of combinations of k · n objects taken k at a time is
In the previous example there are 6 ways to select k = 2 relational nodes from the set of n = 2 candidate nodes.
We also assign an uninformative prior over the possible configurations of the selected relational nodes, again calculating the number of such choices that exist. In general, for the chosen k relational nodes, there are k ways to select the first node of a decision tree (by choosing one of the k nodes).
Now whenever a relational node is added to a tree, two action nodes are also added, but since the new relational node uses one of the existing action nodes, the net addition to the number of action nodes is one. Thus after selecting the first node, k − 1 variables remain for assignment at one of two action nodes. Repeating at the third level, k − 2 variables remain for assignment at one of three action nodes. This process continues until only one variable remains for assignment at k action nodes. The number of tree configurations that can be formed from k decision nodes is thus given by,
In summary, to construct a strategy we select the number of nodes, k, to be used in the formation of a strategy; we hypothesize a set of n candidate relational node variables, and choose k specific nodes from them; and we then construct all possible trees from k nodes using the chosen variables.
Thus the total number of strategies with k nodes that can be formed from n candidate variables is the product of the two preceding results:
In our previous example, there are 6 · 4 = 24 possible ways to construct a strategy with k = 2 decision nodes from a set of n = 2 relational nodes.
Thus the prior probability distributions are as follows: the prior probability of k relational nodes P (k) is given by the Poisson distribution truncated at k = 4, the prior probability of selecting any k relational nodes from a set of n variables is 1/S k n , and the prior probability of any particular arrangement of k relational nodes into a strategy is 1/T k . 17 17 Our implicit assumption regarding the error rate in strategy implementation will be that each possible rate is equally likely. This relatively crude prior for the error rate we justify by the fact that we are estimating decision rules on a subject-by-subject basis; if pooling across the population one would want to explore different distributions.
We believe that the crucial feature of our strategy inference method is it is simple to implement and therefore more likely to be used by other researchers. We believe that our assumption of simple strategies and our strategy of forming priors is typically valid in the experimental laboratory, where, thanks to experimental controls, there is likely to be relatively little information on which to condition behavior, and where limited depth of reasoning limits the size of the trees.
Building the Likelihood Function
For the probability model, let
t ) = (P (t), t) be the set of explanatory variables observed at time t. Let y t = W (t) ∈ {0, 1, +} be the action taken by the subject at time t. The set of actions corresponds to the decisions to withhold 0, 1, or more than one unit of demand in a given round.
We consider a class of strategies called binary decision trees, which consist of a set of relational nodes and a set of action nodes. Each relational node is a test of the form x
j is a coefficient. The set of coefficients that was actually realized in the experiment for each variable constitutes the set of admitted coefficients. If the evaluation of the test is true (false) then a left (right) descendant node is reached. Descendant nodes of relational nodes may be either relational nodes or action nodes. Action nodes specify an action to take and have no descendant nodes. Hence a relational test may be followed by a subsequent (i.e., nested) relational test, or it may be followed by the specification of an action to take.
A strategy g ∈ G can be thought of as a possibly nested if-then statement that always specifies an action to take conditional on realizations of variables determined to be important to decisionmaking. Every data point y t , x t , when dropped through the decision tree, always reaches exactly one action node. Thus we can compare the actions specified by the strategy with every action observed in the data. It follows that we interpret the strategy as a plan of action for every possible observed contingency in the game.
Let D g |x t denote the action specified by the strategy given the observed data at time t. Define Chipman, George and McCulloch (2001) provide a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method assuming a multinomial distribution for the errors; for robustness we tested our data using their software and found similar strategies.
the variable
That is, x g,t = 1 if the action specified by the strategy agrees with the action taken by the subject.
Summing the number of actions that agree with the strategy yields X g = T t=1 x g,t .
A subject takes the action specified by a strategy with probability 1 − , and randomizes with equal probability among each possible action with total probability whenever she deviates from the strategy. As in El-Gamal and Grether (1995), a strategy g ∈ G and error rate define a probability 
The estimate forˆ is found by forcing the rule to make the decision that occurs most often at each action node, summing the number of decisions in the data that do not agree with the strategy specification, and then dividing by the total number of decisions made.
Computing the Posterior Mode Estimate
The posterior mode estimate of the joint assignment of the number of nodes, the specific nodes, the arrangement of the nodes in the tree, and the error is:
The first two terms specify the fitness of the strategy, while each of the last three terms corresponds to a prior probability for one of the three assignment problems. The priors have the effect of penalizing the likelihood function for the model complexity, since each of the three terms is a decreasing function of the number of relational nodes in the strategy. We therefore force a tradeoff between strategy fitness and complexity, where strategy complexity is crudely approximated by the number of relational nodes. A possible outcome of this tradeoff is that the degenerate strategy with no conditioning nodes at all is inferred from the decisions of the subject. Our conservative approach to strategy inference as implied by the triple penalty for each additional relational node implies that those strategies that are inferred perform well at categorizing the subject's withholding behavior.
Computational Strategy
We compute the posterior likelihood for each possible strategy formulation for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} for each buyer. 18 We report the posterior probability for each of the possible values of k, as well as the probability that each explanatory variable along with its impact on withholding occurs in the strategy. For robustness we report these results as a function of the mean, λ, of the Poisson prior for k, where λ varies from 1 to 3 in increments of 0.1. We report summary statistics for the modal strategies inferred at a selected value of the mean, and we report the modal strategy for all subjects in selected experimental sessions.
Strategy Inference Results
We present the results in three sub-sections. First, we present inference results aggregated across experimental treatments. Second, we present posterior distributional results for each buyer in the form of strategy characteristic statistics such as, for example, the probability that the buyer's strategy contains k nodes, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and that it contains specific strategy characteristics or components. We also explore correlations between specific strategy characteristics and market outcomes. Third, we display inferred strategies that correspond to the posterior mode estimate for each subject in selected sessions. 19 For the purposes of introducing this strategy inference method and for brevity we focus primarily on buyer strategies. 18 An exhaustive search is possible due to our limitation of k ≤ 4; the number of possible strategies was typically on the order of 100,000. Our approach is not however limited to cases in which an exhaustive search is possible. The software for estimation was programmed in Ox 3 Professional (Doornik, 2001 ) and is available upon request from the authors. 19 In fact, we computed the modal strategy for all subjects in all sessions. Due to space restrictions, we present the modal strategies for all buyers in two specific sessions in section 6.4.
Aggregate Results on Strategy Complexity and Strategy Composition
Strategy Complexity
On average, the complexity of the inferred strategies is greater than the degenerate case of zero relational nodes, and is relatively insensitive to its prior. Figure 6 presents the number of relational nodes in the strategy that corresponds to the posterior mode estimate, averaged across all subjects in all treatments. This measure attests to the relative stability of the number of nodes in the inferred modal strategies to changes in the prior mean number of nodes: it varies by only 0.6 nodes, from 0.9 to 1.5, as the prior mean number of relational nodes varies from one to three. (We varied the prior from one to three because we limited non-zero probabilities between zero and four nodes). The expected number of relational nodes (computed as the weighted average of strategy size over all possible strategies) is similarly stable: Figure 6 also shows that the expected number of relational nodes varies by only 0.6 nodes, from 1.6 to 2.2, as the prior varies from one to three. The fact that the average strategy size for both of these measures consists of more than one relational node despite the triple cost of complexity suggests the inferred repeated-game strategies fit well buyers' decisions.
[insert Figure 6 here]
Figures 7a and 7b display the average number of relational nodes in the modal strategies according to the experimental treatment variable. Figure 7a reveals that modal strategies are slightly more complex in the informed experimental treatments. This result was unexpected as it is the information given to the monopolist, not the buyers, that is being manipulated. One conjecture is that since the monopolist does not know how many buyers she faces in the uninformed treatments, buyers feel they must adopt simpler, more transparent strategies and stick with them to signal clearly to the monopolist what is unacceptable; whereas buyers in the informed treatments have the luxury to be able to fine tune (i.e., make more complex) their withholding behavior.
Strategy complexity as a function of the number of buyers does not reveal a similarly evident relationship: Figure 7b shows that whether strategies are more complex with different numbers of buyers depends on the prior.
[insert Figures 7a and 7b here] 
Strategy Composition
For a look at the composition of the buyer strategies, Figures 8a and 8b display the probability that the buyer strategies contain a relational node that increases and decreases withholding with time respectively. We denote these node types "Time +" and "Time -", respectively, and similarly define the node types "Price +" and "Price -". For example, the t ≤ 10 relational node in Figure 4 is a Time + node because the buyer increases her withholding after round 10 These figures reveal important differences between the experimental treatments. Most notably, Figure 8a shows that nodes decreasing withholding with time are more likely to occur in strategies in the two-buyer, informed treatment than in the four-buyer, informed treatment. Figure 8b shows that the opposite is true for increasing withholding with time, namely, that buyers in the fourbuyer, informed treatment are more likely to increase their withholding with time than buyers in the two-buyer, informed treatment. This marked difference in the strategies employed by buyers in the two-buyer and four-buyer informed treatments points to a possible explanation for the lower observed prices in the two-buyer, informed sessions: decreasing withholding over time appears to be a more effective strategy against the monopolist than increasing withholding over time. We will have more to say about this hypothesis in the next two subsections.
In addition, Figure 9a shows that decreasing withholding with price is equally highly unlikely in all treatments; this intuitive result serves to validate the inference procedure, as we do not expect subjects to buy more units (i.e. decrease their withholding) as the price increases. Figure 9b shows that increasing withholding with price is more likely to occur in strategies when monopolists are informed.
[insert Figures 9a and 9b here] 
Strategy Characteristics for Individual Buyers
In the previous subsection we explored strategy complexity and composition at the treatment level varying the prior mean number of relational nodes from one to three. In this subsection we examine more closely the inferred strategy characteristics at the subject level by reporting the posterior estimates of the distributions of inferred strategies for individual buyers. To report the distributions of strategy characteristics for each individual buyer over the range of prior mean numbers of relational nodes from one to three would be far too unwieldy. For the sake of parsimony we must therefore select a specific prior mean number of relational nodes. The good news is that all of the strategy complexity and strategy composition observations have been shown in the previous subsection to be insensitive to the prior mean number of relational nodes. To avoid taking a strong stand on the choice of a prior, we choose two, the midpoint of the range of the priors explored. Table 1 displays the results for the two-buyer, informed treatment, and Tables 2, 3, and 4 contain identical information for the remaining three treatments. Each row reports the strategy characteristics and observed game variables for a different buyer. From left to right the tables reveal the session and subject identification numbers, the median session price from the last five rounds, the mean seller and buyer per round profits, the breakdown of each buyer's observed withholding decisions (i.e., the number of rounds in which the buyer withhold 0, 1 and multiple units of demand), the number of relational nodes inferred in the modal strategy (labeled "size"), the error rate of the modal strategy (to be discussed below), and the posterior probability that the buyer's strategy contains 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 relational nodes (which sum to 1). The last set of columns report the posterior probability that the strategy contains the conditioning nodes Time -, Time +, Priceand Price +. These may sum from zero (when the posterior probability of a zero node strategy is one) to four (when only strategies that contain at least one of each of the four nodes have non-zero posterior probabilities). Table 1 reveals the richness of information regarding buyer heterogeneity that can be gleaned from a strategy inference procedure. Overall, for three-quarters of the buyers in the experiments the modal strategy is a non-degenerate strategy with at least one relational node. There is much heterogeneity among these subjects with respect to the size of the inferred modal strategy (between 1 and 4 relational nodes) and the posterior probabilities of the strategy characteristics. That the inferred modal strategies differ across buyers both in terms of the strategy characteristics and in size despite the common prior for all buyers suggests that the strategies are not being overwhelmed by the prior and that they describe the buyers' decisions well. Further evidence that the strategies fit the decisions well can be seen by the error rate, which appears in the "modal strategy characteristics" column of Tables 1-4 . Across all treatments, the average error rate is approximately 0.16, meaning that strategies on average classify correctly 84% or 25/30 of the buyer's observed withholding decisions.
[insert Tables 1-4 here]
In the two-buyer, informed treatment, the Time -variable appears far more frequently than any other conditioning variable in the inferred modal strategies of buyers: for 9/14 subjects, the probability that their strategy contains a Time -node exceeds 0.8. By contrast, there is not a single buyer who conditions on Time + with probability greater than 0.8. (In Session 7, Buyer 1's modal strategy contains Time + with probability 0.784.) Two subjects increase their withholding with an increasing price (Price +) with probability greater 0.8. For non-degenerate strategies, error rates vary from 0.033 for a two-relational node strategy to 0.367 for a one-relational node strategy.
The actions of four buyers varied so little that we could only construct the degenerate zero-node strategy. Notice that although Buyer 2 in Session 1 shows considerable variance in her withholding actions -she withheld one or more units in 13 rounds -her apparently somewhat random withholding pattern did not admit the inference of a non-degenerate modal strategy. As a result, the error rate for this buyer is 0.433. As a matter of fact, Session 1 was the lone session in this treatment for which we failed to infer a non-degenerate strategy for both buyers.
In the four-buyer, informed treatment (Table 3) , there is a noticeable shift from Time -nodes to Time + nodes in comparison with the two-buyer, informed treatment. Ten out of 32 buyers condition on Time -with probability greater than 0.8. This same fraction conditions on Time +.
(Recall that only one buyer in the two-buyer, informed treatment conditioned Time + with a probability close to 0.8.) Figures 8a and 8b confirm that this treatment is an outlier both in terms of the high posterior probability that an average buyer's strategy contains a Time + node and the low posterior probability that it contains Time -. In addition, six buyers employ Price + with probability greater than 0.8. We inferred non-degenerate modal strategies for two or more buyers in all eight sessions.
In the two-buyer, uninformed treatment (Table 2) , strategies again vary by complexity and composition. Indeed the patterns of strategy complexity and composition are broadly very similar to those in the two-buyer, informed treatment. Again there is a single session (Session 29) in which we failed to infer a strategy for both buyers.
In the four-buyer, uninformed treatment (Table 4) , there are far fewer Price + nodes with probability (close to) 0.8 or greater (only two). High posterior probabilities are more spread out among Time -, Time + and Price -nodes: for instance, 17/28 buyers condition on Time -with probability greater than or equal to 0.8 and four buyers condition on Time + with the same probability.
Strategy Effectiveness against the Monopolist
We investigated correlations between strategy characteristics and session price, and seller and buyer profits. The results aggregated across all treatments are presented in Table 5 . Cells marked in bold-face represent statistical significance at the 10% level according to the Spearman Rank Coefficient Test (two-tailed test). The table reveals that both the modal and expected strategy size are negatively and significantly correlated with the median session price: the more complex the strategies used by buyers, the lower the session prices. Similarly, strategy complexity is negatively and significantly correlated with seller profit, but correlation between complexity and buyer profit is not significant. It seems that buyers are able to lower the price through their withholding strategies, at no overall cost (or benefit) to themselves. Put differently, the lower prices that buyers achieve through withholding roughly compensate them for the foregone profit from the withholding. A further indication of the effectiveness of withholding strategies is given by the positive (0.380) and significant correlation between inferring a degenerate strategy (P(Zero Nodes) in Table 5 ) and session price.
[insert Table 5 here]
Correlating the different conditioning nodes with session price suggests that the most effective strategy component against seller pricing is Time -. In fact, Time -is the only strategy component significantly (and negatively) correlated with price: when strategies decrease withholding over time, session price (and seller profits) tend to be significantly lower. The only strategy component that is significantly correlated with buyers' profits is Price -. The negative correlation between the two highlights the obvious fact that if a buyer increases her purchases (i.e., decreases her withholding) when the price increases, her profits will be relatively low.
To further investigate relationships between strategy components and market outcomes we ran regressions with the median session price from the last five rounds of the game, the average seller profit, and average buyer profit as dependent variables. Possible independent variables were the probability that strategies contained Time -, Time +, Price +, and Price -nodes, the size of the modal strategies, and dummies for the two-buyer and informed sessions. All variables were averaged across the individual values for each buyer found in Tables 1-4 . We used the software package PcGets (Hendry and Krolzig, 2001 ) to test down to the final model presented below, and for simplicity report results from one-stage estimation. 20 The results are displayed in Table 6 . The table presents the estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level.
[insert Table 6 here]
The table reveals that two buyers, the probability of a Time -node, and the probability of a Price + node all negatively influence the market price, as measured by the median price from the last five rounds. All three effects are of similar magnitude. Not surprisingly, these same three variables negatively affect seller profits. Concerning buyer profits, only the number of buyers has a significant effect: median buyer profits are 0.3 NIS per round higher in the two-buyer treatments than in the four-buyer treatments. This follows from the fact that prices in the two-buyer sessions are lower, while the quantity of demand withholding does not differ between treatments.
The results provide insight into the effectiveness (and lack thereof) of various withholding strategies. Increasing complexity and decreasing withholding over time (i.e., early withholding) are negatively correlated with seller prices and seller profits. These characteristics are not significantly correlated with buyer profit, even though buyers forego profitable purchases by employing these strategies. Combining this evidence with the existence of remarkably low session prices paints a picture of strategies that influence the monopolist pricing decision at no discernible cost to the buyers.
One plausible explanation for the effectiveness of early withholding is that it signals the buyers' unwillingness to accept existing prices. The monopolist thus responds by lowering her price to increase sales and profits. If buyers do not withhold early on, feeling encouraged, the monopolist may raise her price and continue to do so until she is met with resistance.
Strategies in Selected Sessions
Buyer Strategies
The actual modal strategies inferred in the individual sessions reflected the heterogeneity described by the posterior distributions reported in Tables 1-4 . We selected two sessions with highly interpretable results to complement visually the distributional and statistical results reported in the previous subsection. We present the modal strategies inferred in both a two-buyer, informed session and a four-buyer informed session. We chose informed sessions because they constitute the most likely conditions in which the buyers can convey a clear message to the sellers through strategic withholding. The contrast between a two-buyer and a four-buyer session illustrates the relative effectiveness of withholding strategies employed by buyers in the two-buyer sessions.
The strategies inferred in two-buyer session 2B7 are presented in Figure 10 , and the price series is shown in Figure 11 Again from Figure 13 one can see that this is not for want of price variance. While the withholding was slightly less coordinated in this session than in Session 2B7, again the willingness to withhold demand early combined with price sensitivity appears to have kept pricing far below the monopoly price, and in the region of the competitive range.
[insert Figures 12 and 13 here] 
Seller Strategies
A natural question to ask is what strategies might the monopolist be employing. To answer this, we ran the inference procedure on the sellers, allowing the seller strategies to condition on the number of sales lost to withholding at time t − 1 and the round number. For brevity we report only the best-fitting strategies from Sessions 7 and 10 in Figure 14 . The strategies are interpreted in the same way as the buyer strategies; seller decisions are represented by a "-" indicating the decision to lower the price from time t − 1 to time t, a "0" indicating no change in the price, and a "+" indicating an increase in the price.
The left-hand portion of Figure 14 reveals that the seller in two-buyer Session 7 tends to lower the price in response to demand withholding in excess of one unit. The right-hand portion of Figure   14 presents the inferred strategy of the relatively active seller in Session 10: if more than three units of demand are withheld the monopolist lowers the price, otherwise the modal decision is to increase the price. And these are not isolated examples: the best-fitting strategy is non-trivial for the majority of the sellers in our experiments.
[insert Figure 14 
Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a Bayesian inference method that estimates repeated-game strategies for individuals based on their observed play. The method is quite general: the researcher need only have access to the set of possible conditioning variables and their realized levels observed by the decision makers and the actual decisions made. With this in hand, the researcher must formulate a logical way in which to construct strategies for the purpose of forming priors as well as a probability model to compute a likelihood and the computation of Bayes' rule. The method supplements classical methods of inference in informationally-deficient environments. Results based on experimental data serve to validate the procedure in an environment in which a degree of control exists.
The potential output from the application of this inference method is also quite general: the researcher can report many different outputs, depending on the question of interest, including the posterior mode estimate of the strategy, the probability distribution over all of the different possible strategies, the probability of specific strategy components and even, if desired, the probability of combinations of different components occurring in the strategy.
Indeed, we apply this method to 30-round, posted-offer monopoly experiments to infer unobserved, repeated-game strategies from the observed actions of buyers and sellers. As a first application of this technique, the posted-offer market is well suited: buyers independently make their purchase decisions with their only available, non-trivial action being the rejection of a profitable purchase, referred to as demand withholding. On the basis of buyers' independently made and observable withholding decisions, we are able to infer repeated-game withholding strategies for individual buyers and sellers.
From our application, we report active, repeated-game, demand withholding strategies for threequarters of the buyers in the experiments, while inferring the passive price-taking strategy for the remaining one-quarter of the buyers. The inferred withholding strategies are diverse in their degrees of complexity and in the variables upon which withholding is conditioned. In comparing these diverse strategies, certain regularities emerge. More complex strategies seem to lead to lower seller prices and lower seller profits, apparently at no overall cost the buyers. Equally interesting, we find evidence for the relative effectiveness of certain strategy characteristics compared to others. For instance, withholding that decreases with time (early withholding) is more successful in bringing down prices than withholding that increases over time or withholding triggered by a price threshold.
Higher buyer concentration induces the more successful strategy.
The results from our procedure are robust, conservative and plausible. They are robust because they hold for a wide range of priors. They are conservative because our procedure imposed a triple penalty for strategy complexity. They are plausible because they are not dominated by the priors; in fact, we observed much heterogeneity across subjects' inferred strategies.
The existence and variety of individual repeated-game strategies suggests that we can learn more about strategic behavior in repeated games by at least complementing existing analysis with strategy analysis such as the one in this paper. This is not to negate the importance of reducing or solving the identification problem by bringing more information to bear on the problem (Manski, 2001), including strict experimental control (such as the control we presented in our experiments) or direct elicitation (e.g., Nyarko and Schotter, 2000, who elicited beliefs from subjects). However, this work serves as a non-invasive and complementary approach to better understanding strategic responses to market conditions. Nothing in our technique interferes with the subjects' decisionmaking processes and the results are both intuitive and interpretable. Spearman rank correlations between the posterior probability estimates of various strategy characteristics (rows) and market outcomes aggregated across all sessions (columns). Each cellreports the correlation coefficient (top entry) and the p-value (bottom entry). Significant results appear in bold. Example choice: k = 2 Assignment 2: Select k = 2 variables from Variable Set C = {P1(t), P2(t), t1, t2} Choices: {P1(t), P2(t)}, {P1(t), t1}, P1(t), t2} {P2(t), t1}, {P2(t), t2}, {t1, t2}
Number of Decisions
P(Price-)
Example choice: {P1(t), t1}
Assignment 3: Node Configuration Choices:
An illustration of the assignment problems involved in constructing a single strategy. We form priors over each possible assignment. We construct each possible strategy up to the number of relational nodes k=4. We compute the likelihood of each strategy, and then estimate the posterior probability of each strategy. From this inbformation, we report estimates of the probability that a strategy is of a certain complexity, or contains specific elements. The average number of relational nodes in the posterior modal strategies for the informed (twobuyer and four-buyer) and uninformed (two-buyer and four-buyer) treatments, when the prior mean number of nodes varies from 1 to 3.
The average number of relational nodes in the posterior modal strategies for the two-buyer (informed and uninformed) and four-buyer (informed and uninformed) treatments, when the prior mean number of nodes varies from 1 to 3. The posterior probability that the buyers' strategies (pooled by treatment) contain the relational node that decreases withholding with time (Time -), when the prior mean number of relational nodes is allowed to vary between 1 and 3.
The posterior probability that the buyers' strategies (pooled by treatment) contain the relational node that increases withholding with time (Time +), when the prior mean number of relational nodes is allowed to vary between 1 and 3. The posterior probability that the buyers' strategies (pooled by treatment) contain the relational node that decreases withholding with price (Price -), when the prior mean number of relational nodes is allowed to vary between 1 and 3.
The posterior probability that the buyers' strategies (pooled by treatment) contain the relational node that increases withholding with price (Price +), when the prior mean number of relational nodes is allowed to vary between 1 and 3. The modal strategies inferred for each buyer in this two-buyer session. Buyer 1's strategy reflects price sensitivity after period 5. Buyer 2 is an intense early withholder.
units sold and the number of sales lost to demand withholding by period, respectively. The modal strategies inferred for the sellers in Sessions 7 and 10. Session 7 seller strategy reflects a price reduction whenever more than one unit of demand is withheld. Session 10 seller increases the price when 3 or less units are withheld, and lowers the price otherwise. 
